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Learning Lessons From Sunk Costs
Brian H. Bornstein, Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University
Gretchen B. Chapman, Departments of Medical Education and Psychology,
University of Illinois at Chicago

Study participants rated the quality of several arguments for continuing an original plan in sunk cost situations in order to (a) avoid wasting resources, (b) learn to make better decisions, (c) punish poor decision making, and (d) appear
consistent. The lesson-learning argument was perceived as most appropriate when adult teachers taught lessons to others, the original decision was carelessly made, or if it consumed comparatively more resources. Ratings of the lessonlearning argument were higher for teacher-learner than for adult-alone situations, regardless of whether the learner was
a child or an adult. The implications for improving decision making and judging whether the sunk cost effect is a bias
are discussed.

An unfortunate fact of life is that things frequently do not go as planned. Whatever the reason—poor planning, a change of mind, altered circumstances, or mere bad luck—people must then
decide whether to try something different or continue with their original plans. If individual preferences or circumstances have changed, future utility
would often be increased by changing behaviors.
For example, imagine that you decide you want to
learn how to play the cello. After buying a $1,000
cello and spending an additional $200 for 3 months
of lessons, you lose interest in it and want to stop
taking lessons. What do you do?
Decision makers display the sunk cost (or escalation) effect if they continue to pour resources into
a plan or project even though future utility would be
increased by terminating the plan or switching to an
alternative behavior (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992; Thaler, 1980). In the above example, a frequent response to the dilemma is to continue taking
Portions of this research were presented at the November
1993 Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, Washington, DC. We are grateful to Tammy
Carter for her assistance in running the experiments and Jon
Baron, Eric Braverman, and Arthur Elstein for helpful comments on the manuscript of this article.
Corresponding author: Brian H. Bornstein

more expensive lessons simply because a great deal
of money and time have already been spent and
would otherwise be wasted. Such a response is nonnormative because the decision maker is influenced
by the initial investment (i.e., the cost of the cello
and the lessons), even though it is irretrievably lost
and therefore irrelevant in weighing the future consequences of the current decision.
This kind of reasoning has been observed in a
variety of situations. Sunk costs influence personal
decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Garland & Newport, 1991), financial decisions in business (Garland, 1990; Staw, 1976),
evaluations of employees’ performance (Bazerman,
Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982), and competitive behavior (Teger, 1980). These diverse situations are
all cases in which the mere fact of an initial investment—usually money or time—can influence a decision maker’s subsequent behavior, although future
resources could be used more effectively in another
manner.
Factors Affecting the Sunk Cost Effect
An obvious prediction that is consistent with the
sunk cost effect is that the greater the initial investment, the stronger the effect should be; for example,
one should be more likely to continue taking cello
251
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lessons if the cello cost $1,000 than if it cost $100
or nothing. Experimental evidence has supported
this prediction (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland,
1990), although Garland and Newport (1991) have
found that the absolute amount of the initial investment is less important than the relative cost compared with an individual’s total available resources.
The importance of relative costs is consistent with
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), according to which future losses (here the displeasure produced by continuing the lessons) result in a
smaller decrease in subjective value as the amount
already lost (i.e., the cost of the cello and the initial
lessons) increases (see also Thaler, 1980).
Situational factors may also come into play. For
example, Staw (1976) and Whyte (1993) reported
that sunk cost behavior was more frequent when
the decision maker felt personally responsible for
any negative consequences engendered by the original plan of action. In contrast, Simonson and Nye
(1992) found that accountability for one’s decision
decreased susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. Simonson and Nye’s results were likely influenced by
their use of business students, many of whom had
been formally trained to avoid the sunk cost effect
(cf. Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). Finally,
Arkes and Blumer (1985) found no consistent relationship between sunk cost behavior and whether
oneself or a third party made the decision. These
studies indicate that the effect of personal involvement on behavior in such situations is still unclear.
Are There Rational Reasons for Sunk Cost?
The decision to continue with a plan because
of sunk costs is usually viewed as a cognitive bias
(Baron, 1990). Regardless of the arguments on
which the decision is based, if all other factors are
equal, then greater utility is achieved by ignoring past costs and attending solely to future consequences. However, there are circumstances in which
sunk cost behavior may in fact be rational in the
sense of increasing overall utility.
People typically justify sunk cost behavior because they do not wish to appear wasteful (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985; Frisch, 1993; Teger, 1980). Because
it is adaptive not to waste resources, a rule against
waste is generally a good rule to have. However, it
may also be maladaptive, as when the rule is over-
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generalized to situations in which the resources have
already been sunk and remaining resources might
be more useful elsewhere (Baron, 1990). Such reasoning attends to irrelevant factors and is therefore
counterproductive from a utilitarian perspective.
However, a number of potentially rational reasons might underlie the apparently irrational inclination not to waste irretrievably lost resources. Three
such reasons are the opportunity to learn a lesson,
punishment for making a bad decision, and the desire to appear to be a consistent decision maker. Below we address each of these reasons for continuing
a failed plan.
One reason why individuals might continue with
a failed plan (like playing an instrument despite not
enjoying it) is to teach themselves that next time
they should think carefully before making an expensive purchase. This argument is potentially rational
because it may lead to improved future decisions.
However, it implies that the decision maker has two
“selves,” one a teacher and the other a learner. A
number of decision theorists have portrayed the decision maker as having multiple selves (e.g., Elster,
1986; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For example, Thaler and Shefrin’s (1981) theory of self-control describes the decision maker as consisting of both a
“myopic doer,” who executes decisions but is influenced only by short-term consequences, and a “farsighted planner,” who is concerned with lifetime
utility. Self-control is achieved when the planner
persuades the doer to act in accordance with longterm goals.
The learn-a-lesson argument for sunk cost behavior is similar, but it implies a teacher and a learner,
rather than a planner and a doer. Such an argument
is even more plausible if the teacher and learner actually are two people, especially in situations where
lesson teaching is clearly appropriate, such as a parent teaching a child. Children’s decision making
is subject to a number of cognitive biases (Baron,
Granato, Spranca, & Teubal, 1993; Klayman, 1985),
which are unlikely to be corrected by mere experience (Baron, 1990). Hence, parents can play an important and potentially effective role in teaching
their children how to be better decision makers.
A second reason for continuing a failed plan is
to endure the failed outcome as penance for making a bad decision. Punishment decreases the likelihood that the decision maker will make the same re-
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sponse in the future; therefore, it would also serve
the function of teaching the decision maker a lesson. Like the learn-a-lesson argument, punishment
implies a decision maker with learner and teacher–
punisher components. Unlike the learn-a-lesson reasoning, however, punishment can deliver retribution
with no explicit explanation for why the punishment
is necessary (other than that the decision maker deserves it). Thus, punishment is a rational defense
for attending to sunk costs if it provides deterrence
against future bad decision making but not if it provides mere vengeance. Consequently, continuing in
order to learn a lesson should be more effective at
changing the learner’s behavior than continuing as
penance.
A final line of reasoning for continuing the plan
is to present the appearance of a good, consistent
decision maker. Changing a course of action is often interpreted as meaning that the original decision
was poorly made—an admission of error—and consistency may bring admiration from others (Staw,
1981; Staw & Ross, 1987). Thus, this argument can
be viewed as rational because of the high subjective
utility associated with a favorable self-presentation
(cf. Goffman, 1959). Like the learn-a-lesson and
punishment arguments, the consistency argument
also implies a multiple-self decision maker (i.e., an
actor and an evaluator).
In addition to its influence on the opinion of others, continuing a plan already underway also allows one to view oneself as a good decision maker;
that is, escalation is often motivated by self-justification (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994; Brockner, 1992).
This would be the case if one adhered to a rule always to finish what one has started. However, such
a personal rule (cf. Ainslie, 1986) would not be affected by situational variables shown to influence
sunk cost behavior, such as the amount of the initial
investment.
These potentially rational reasons for continuing an original plan will not apply to all sunk cost
situations. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985,
Experiment 6) showed that most subjects would
choose to eat the more expensive of two previously
purchased, identical TV dinners. In this situation,
more cannot be learned by eating the more expensive dinner, nor does one appear more consistent by
doing so. Such rationales are feasible only in situations where one has invested an initial cost and is
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then faced with the options of continuing the original plan or switching to a more cost-effective alternative. However, one is infrequently forced to
choose between two alternatives that are identical
except for their cost; on the other hand, there are
frequently times when changing circumstances require a choice between one’s original plan and trying something different.

Experimental Overview
We conducted three experiments to explore potentially rational justifications for sunk cost behavior in such “continue-or-switch” situations. In
each experiment, participants read a series of scenarios and rated five possible responses, including
the normative response (switch to a more cost-effective alternative), the traditional sunk cost argument (the waste response), and the learn-a-lesson,
punishment, and consistency arguments described
above. These last four responses all involved a continuation of the original plan. We addressed the effect of a number of factors on the attractiveness of
each of these responses. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the care with which the original decision
had been made, the amount of the initial investment, and whether a parent had an opportunity to
teach a lesson to a child. In Experiments 2 and 3,
we investigated the role of personal responsibility
and the effect on sunk cost behavior of the lesson
learner’s age and relationship to the teacher. If sunk
cost (i.e., continuation) behavior occurs for some or
all of these reasons, it should be more common in
some situations than others.

Experiment 1
Study participants rated the attractiveness of each
response for a number of scenarios. These scenarios
varied as a function of three variables: Whether (a)
the decision maker was portrayed as an adult acting
alone or as a parent deciding with a child; (b) the decision was made carefully or carelessly; and (c) the
initial investment was relatively large or small. We
make specific predictions (see Table 1) for each of
these variables.
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The importance of learning a lesson is predicted
to increase as the amount of the initial investment
increases because it is most important to avoid repeating previous mistakes in high-stakes situations.
The decision care variable is also clearly related to
the issue of learning how to make good decisions,
as decisions that are made thoroughly and carefully
will on average produce better outcomes than those
that are not. Thus, we predict that the learn-a-lesson
response will receive higher ratings when the decision has been made carelessly because future decision making could thereby be improved more than
when the decision was made well but turned out
poorly anyway.
Whether the decision maker is an adult alone or
a parent making a decision on behalf of a child is
also directly relevant to the learn-a-lesson response.
If lesson learning is used as a justification, then one
should be more likely to continue with a suboptimal
plan in order to teach a child a lesson than to teach
oneself a lesson. Teaching oneself a lesson highlights the paradoxical nature of a multiple-self representation of decision making (Thaler & Shefrin,
1981): oneself presumably already knows the lesson (otherwise, how could one teach it?), whereas a
child may not yet have had the opportunity to learn
the lesson.
If punishment serves the same function as learning a lesson—that is, improving future behavior—
then this response should also be affected by the
level of initial resources, decision care, and whether
the decision maker is a single person or a parent
and child together. With regard to the amount of the
initial investment, for example, an analogy can be
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drawn from tort law, in which greater deterrence
(accomplished through the awarding of damages)
is desired for acts resulting in relatively more harmful consequences (Landes & Posner, 1987). Because
losing a large initial investment in a sunk cost situation is more harmful than losing a small investment,
the attractiveness of punishment for deterrent purposes would be greater in the former case. However,
we predict that the punishment response will be less
attractive than the learn-a-lesson response overall
because the latter contains a clearer explanation of
the future benefits that will accrue.
The level of resources already invested is also
predicted to affect ratings of the consistency response, on the grounds that it is more important to
present an image as a competent decision maker
when the stakes are relatively high than when little
is at risk (Staw, 1981). With regard to decision care,
carelessly made decisions might produce a negative image of the decision maker and thereby create greater self-presentation demands; on the other
hand, a careless decision might lessen self-presentation demands, by providing a convenient excuse
for the poor outcome that does not necessarily reflect a stable behavior pattern. Hence we make no
prediction relating the care with which a decision
was made to the consistency rationale. As with decision care, there are competing hypotheses for the
expected effect of the decision maker on the consistency argument. On the one hand, children are
less cognizant of self-presentation demands than
adults (Goffman, 1959), making this argument less
attractive in the parent–child condition. Yet parents may be more concerned with creating a favor-

Table 1. Predicted Effect of Amount of Invested Resources, Identity of Decision Maker, and
Decision Care on Five Different Responses
Response
Variable

Normative

Waste

Lesson

Consistency

Invested resources		
High		



Low
				
Decision maker
Parent and child		
—

—
Adult alone

—		
—
Decision care
Carefully

—		
—
Carelessly		
—

—

Punishment






Note. Check marks indicate the level of each variable for which a response is predicted to receive relatively
higher ratings. Dash indicates there was no prediction for how that variable should influence ratings of that
response.
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able presentation for their children than for themselves. Therefore, we make no prediction about the
effect of who the decision maker is on the consistency rationale.
In keeping with the basic sunk cost effect demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Arkes & Blumer,
1985; Garland, 1990), we predict that the normative
response will be rated lower when a high level of resources has already been invested than when the initial investment was small and that the opposite will
be true for the waste response. In addition, the normative response will receive lower ratings when a
parent and child are making the decision together
or when the decision was made carelessly. The attractiveness of various reasons for continuing the
plan is predicted to increase in those circumstances,
and the attractiveness of an option tends to decrease
as the attractiveness of a competing alternative increases (Baron, 1994). Finally, we predict that the
attractiveness of the waste response will not be affected either by the identity of the decision maker or
by the care with which the decision was made. The
desire not to waste resources should depend solely
on the amount of resources that has already been invested and therefore is independent of these other
two variables.
Method
Participants
The participants were 80 students from Louisiana
State University who received course credit.
Materials and design
Eight scenarios were developed (summarized in
the Appendix), each of which describes a situation
in which a decision maker has invested resources
(either time or money, or both) in an initial plan of
action. Subsequently, circumstances or preferences
change, forcing the decision maker to choose between continuing the original plan and switching
to an alternative plan. For each scenario, eight conditions were constructed by crossing three binary
variables: (a) amount of resources already invested
(high or low); (b) decision care (whether the decision had been made “after careful consideration” or
“on the spur of the moment”); and (c) the identity of
the decision maker (whether the decision was made
by an adult alone or by a parent and child together).
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For example, see Scenario 1 with alternate versions
in parentheses below:
Agatha (Agatha’s young daughter Becky) decides
after careful consideration (on the spur of the moment) that she wants to take cello lessons. Agatha
spends $1,000 ($100) on a beginner cello and an additional $200 ($40) on the first 3 months (1 month)
of cello lessons. After 3 months (1 month) of lessons, Agatha (Becky) realizes that she no longer enjoys the cello and wants to stop taking lessons. It is
almost certain that if she signs up for more lessons,
she will not enjoy them and will never enjoy playing
the cello. What should Agatha do?
Each participant saw one version of each of the
eight scenarios. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight counterbalancing conditions,
such that each participant read a set containing all
eight scenarios and all combinations of the three
factors described above. Across sets, the scenarios
were always presented in the same order; the order
of the conditions within each set was varied according to a Latin-square design, such that each condition appeared in each ordinal position one eighth of
the time. Across all participants, all 64 combinations
of scenarios and conditions were presented. The design is illustrated in Table 2.
Procedure
After reading each scenario, participants rated the
desirability of all five possible responses, with a 10point scale. Previous research on the sunk cost effect
(e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Larrick et al., 1990)
has required participants simply to choose one response from two alternatives (i.e., either continue
the original plan or switch to the new alternative).
Table 2. Design of Experiment 1
Scenario
Set
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H

1
psh
pch
psl
pel
ash
ach
asl
acl

2
pch
psl
pel
ash
ach
asl
acl
psh

3
psl
pel
ash
ach
asl
acl
psh
pch

4
pel
ash
ach
asl
acl
psh
pch
psl

5
ash
ach
asl
acl
psh
pch
psl
pel

6
ach
asl
acl
psh
pch
psl
pel
ash

7
asl
acl
psh
pch
psl
pel
ash
ach

8
acl
psh
pch
psl
pel
ash
ach
asl

Note. Letters refer to the level of each of three variables.
Identity of the decision maker (parent-child = p and adult
alone = a), decision care (carefully = c and carelessly = s),
and amount of resources invested (high = h and low = 1).
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Table 3. Percentage of Trials Receiving Highest Rating and Mean Ratings With Standard Deviations for
Each Response

Response
Normative
Waste
Learn a lesson
Consistency
Punishment

%
61.7
15.6
8.9
8.8
5.0

1
M
6.88***
4.76***
3.79***
3.37***
2.28***

SD
3.14
3.03
2.84
2.57
2.06

Experiment
2
%
M
44.9
15.2
21.5
14.6
3.8

5.66***
4.60
4.58***
3.87***
1.82***

SD

%

3.26
3.07
2.99
2.82
1.75

62.1
12.6
12.9
8.0
4.4

3
M

SD

7.07***
4.70***
4.02***
3.36***
2.50***

3.06
2.97
2.90
2.49
2.15

Note. Means were compared with the next lowest response or with the minimum rating of 1 if there was no lower
response.
***p < .001 to correct for multiple comparisons.

We used a rating method to allow an evaluation of
the different reasons that participants might rely on
in choosing to continue the original plan. The rating scale has the additional advantage of permitting
parametric analyses. The 10-point rating scale was
anchored at 10, “a very good response, the one that
[the decision maker] should definitely follow,” and
1, “a very bad response, that [the decision maker]
should definitely not follow.” Use of the scale was
unconstrained; that is, participants were not required
to allocate a predetermined number of points across
the five responses, and multiple responses could receive the same rating.
The five responses—which varied slightly depending on the identity of the decision maker—were
normative (e.g., “Agatha should [let Becky] stop
taking cello lessons because it would be a waste of
time and money to take more lessons that she won’t
enjoy”); waste (e.g., “Agatha should [make Becky]
continue with the lessons because otherwise she will
have wasted the money and time already spent”);
learn-a-lesson (e.g., “Agatha should [make Becky]
continue lessons to teach her[self] that next time she
should be more careful about what hobbies she selects for herself”); punishment (e.g., “if she was
foolish enough to select a hobby that she doesn’t enjoy, she deserves to suffer by continuing with her
lessons”); and consistency (e.g., “if she stops taking
lessons, that would mean she made a bad decision in
deciding to take cello lessons. . . . If it was the right
decision then, it is still the right decision”; modeled
after an alternative used by Larrick et al., 1990). The
order of the responses was determined randomly for

each scenario, with the constraint that each response
appear in each ordinal position at least once across
the eight scenarios.
After completing the decision scenarios, participants provided information on their frequency of engaging in five sunk cost activities (e.g., continuing
to watch a boring movie).1 The entire questionnaire
took 20 to 30 min to complete.
Results
Average ratings of the five responses
Four of the responses involved continuing the
failed plan, whereas only one response (normative)
involved switching to the new plan. This design may
result in an overestimation of the tendency for participants to stick with the original plan, but it is unlikely to affect either the ordering of the four “continue” responses or the effect of the independent
variables on the response ratings. Table 3 shows
the average ratings of the five responses and the
1

Participants provided this information in all three experiments. Each activity was rated on a 1-to-10 scale—with
high numbers indicating a greater likelihood of abandoning
a plan that is no longer optimal—and the five ratings were
averaged to form one score. We examined the correlations
between these activity scores and ratings of the five types of
scenario responses. We predicted that activity scores would
be negatively correlated with waste response ratings and
positively correlated with normative response ratings. We
did not obtain any consistent correlations between participants’ reports of everyday behavior and their questionnaire
responses.

L earning L essons F rom S unk C osts

257

Table 4. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 1
Response
Normative
Variable

M

SD

Waste
M

Invested resources			
High
6.50
3.24 5.12**
Low
7.27** 2.98 4.39
Decision maker				
Parent and child
6.28
3.25 4.86
Adult alone
7.49** 2.89 4.66
Decision care				
Carefully
6.92
3.13 4.66
Carelessly
6.84
3.14 4.86

Lesson
SD

M

SD

Consistency
M

SD

Punishment
M

SD

3.05
2.96

4.05** 2.92
3.52
2.73

3.55** 2.63
3.20 2.51

2.49** 2.28
2.07 1.79

3.09
2.96

4.56** 3.02
3.01
2.40

3.57** 2.73
3.16 2.39

2.61** 2.33
1.94 1.68

2.86
3.18

3.62
3.96*

3.33
3.40

2.25
2.31

2.78
2.89

2.54
2.61

2.06
2.06

*p < .07. **p < .05.

percentage of trials on which each response was
rated highest.
The normative response received the highest
mean rating (6.88) and was also assigned the highest rating on the majority of trials (63%). The waste
response was given a lower average rating (4.76),
and the learn-a-lesson response a still lower rating (3.79). The consistency (3.37) and punishment
(2.28) responses received the lowest ratings. The
mean rating for each response was significantly different from all other responses (p < .001).2 In addition, the order of the four “continue” responses (determined by their mean ratings) was the same both
for trials where the normative response received the
highest rating and for trials where one of the “continue” responses received the highest rating.
The normative response was negatively correlated with each of the four “continue” responses
(r s ranged from −.30 to −.51, n = 80, p s < .001);
whereas the four “continue” responses were positively correlated with one another (r s ranged from
.41 to .50, p s < .001). Although the learn-a-lesson
response is conceptually similar to the punishment
response, the correlation between these two (r = .47)
was not significantly higher than that between any
other two “continue” responses. This pattern of correlations was replicated in Experiments 2 and 3.
Effects of decision care, decision maker, and amount
of invested resources
Each of the five responses was used as the dependent variable in an analysis of variance (ANOVA)

model containing the between-subjects variable of
counterbalancing condition (i.e., stimulus set) and
the within-subjects variables of scenario, decision
maker (parent–child or adult alone), decision-care
(carefully or carelessly), and level of invested resources (high or low). Although we did not predict
any interactions, two-way interactions among the
latter three variables were included in the models.3
Mean ratings are presented in Table 4.
2 For each participant, we also calculated the percentage of trials on which that participant rated each response
highest and then averaged these percentages across participants (see Table 3). In all three experiments, pairwise comparisons of the percentages showed fewer significant differences than the pairwise comparisons of means, although the
overall patterns were the same. Most importantly, the percentage measure also revealed systematic differences among
the responses; for example, the learn-a-lesson response was
rated highest on a significantly greater percentage of trials
than the punishment response in all three experiments; Experiment 1: t (79) = 1.87; p < .07; Experiments 2 and 3: t s >
4.3; p s < .001. We limit our discussion to the analyses of response means.
3 The counterbalancing variable of stimulus set did not
have an effect in any of the three experiments. An additional counterbalancing measure, presentation order—used
only in Experiment 3—also did not affect participants’ responses. However, in all three experiments there was a main
effect of scenario. Separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
within each scenario indicated stronger manipulation effects
for some scenarios than others; however, these effects were
not systematic across experiments. Other researchers (e.g.,
Frisch, 1993) have also demonstrated differences between
alternate sunk cost scenarios. As we were interested in generalities instead of responses to particular cases, we do not

258

B ornstein & C hapman

As in other research (e.g., Arkes & Blumer,
1985; Garland, 1990), the waste response was rated
as more appropriate when a large amount of resources had been sunk into the project than when a
small amount had been invested, F(1, 540) = 15.17,
p < .0001. Conversely, the normative response was
viewed as more appropriate when a small amount of
resources had been sunk into the project than when a
large amount had been invested, F(1, 540) = 13.95,
p < .0001. As predicted, the normative response was
also viewed as more appropriate when the decision
maker was an adult acting alone than when a parent and child acted together, F(1, 540) = 32.91, p <
.0001, but contrary to our hypothesis, it was not affected by decision care (F < 1). Consistent with our
predictions, ratings of the waste response were affected by neither decision care nor the identity of
the decision maker.
The mean rating for the learn-a-lesson response
for decisions made by a parent and child together
was higher than for decisions made by an adult
alone, F(1, 540) = 73.39, p < .0001. Figure 1 shows
learn-a-lesson ratings for decisions made carefully
or carelessly, plotted as a function of level of resources already invested. There was a main effect
of invested resources, indicating higher ratings
with a high level of investment, F(1, 540) = 8.46, p
< .01. Also of interest, although the main effect of
decision care was only marginally significant, F(1,
540) = 3.53, p < .07, there was an interaction between decision care and level of resources invested,
F(1, 540) = 6.78, p < .01, indicating that for a high
level of sunk cost (but not for a low level), the lesson response was rated higher for decisions made
carelessly.

discuss scenario effects further. Higher order interactions
were not included in the ANOVA models because they were
not predicted by prior theory and would not be readily interpretable. For this and subsequent experiments, we also
computed logistic regression analyses where the dependent
variable for each of the five responses was whether that response received the highest rating. Because some of the responses virtually never received the highest rating of the five
responses (e.g., punishment), we report only the ANOVA results on mean ratings, which showed the same general pattern of effects as the logistic regression analyses.
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of the learn-a-lesson response with
standard errors for Experiment 1 shown as a function of
level of invested resources (high or low) and decision care
(decision made carelessly or carefully)

Consistency and punishment ratings both showed
main effects indicating higher ratings for a high versus a low level of invested resources and for a parent and child acting together versus an adult alone,
F s(1, 539) > 4.7, p s < .03.
This general pattern of results was not limited
to the parent–child scenarios. For example, within
the adult-alone condition, the learn-a-lesson response was still perceived as more appropriate than
the punishment response, t (316) = 8.26, p < .001,
and roughly as good as the consistency response, t
(316) = −1.19, p > .2; in addition, it was rated higher
for careless than for careful decisions, F(1, 227) =
10.57, p < .005.
Discussion
These results clearly demonstrate the classic sunk
cost effect. All four responses advocating the continuation of the original plan received higher ratings when a relatively large amount of resources
had already been invested. In contrast, the normative response advocating termination of the original plan received higher ratings when a relatively
small amount of resources had been invested. Reasons underlying the sunk cost effect can be determined by examining the ratings of the four continuation responses. Although the waste response had
the highest rating of the four, indicating that a desire
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to avoid wastefulness is the primary motivation behind sunk cost behavior (Frisch, 1993; Teger, 1980),
the learn-a-lesson response received the next highest rating, indicating that it too can be an important
justification.
In addition, the attractiveness of the learn-a-lesson response was influenced by two variables predicted to affect the appropriateness of this argument.
Learning a lesson was viewed as more appropriate when a parent had an opportunity to teach a lesson to a child than for an adult alone and when the
original decision had been made carelessly rather
than carefully. A child is less likely to have already
learned the lesson and has a longer life expectancy
in which to benefit from the lesson compared with
an adult. In addition, the parent–child situation provides social roles encouraging lesson teaching and
also makes explicit the two selves involved in the
decision. The normative response to switch to a new
plan is correspondingly less attractive in parent–
child situations.
Learning a lesson is more effective when a decision has been made carelessly because the decision
maker has the opportunity to learn to be more careful.
There may be no way to improve future decisions if
the original decision was already made carefully. This
suggests that participants are sensitive to the manner
in which the original decision was made, as well as to
the relationship between decision quality and decision
outcome. Furthermore, a careless decision is of little consequence if it does not waste many resources;
thus, learning a lesson is more important when careless decisions have incurred large costs.
This result suggests a continuum from trivial decisions (those involving few resources) to monumental decisions (involving extensive resources). Learning to make trivial decisions carefully is not worth
the trouble, as it will save few future resources. In
making a decision, factors other than the accuracy
of the decision’s outcome—such as the time and effort expended in making the decision—also need to
be considered (Baron, 1994; Kunda, 1990; Shugan,
1980). In contrast, learning to make important decisions carefully is well worth the effort. Thus, although learning a lesson is influenced by the waste
of resources, it is the waste of future resources, not
past ones, that drives this argument. Consequently,
what appears on the surface to be traditional sunk
cost (and therefore irrational) reasoning can be justified because of its beneficial effects on future decision making.
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However, just as ignoring sunk costs is not always the optimal response, continuing a failed plan
in order to learn a lesson will not always be optimal either. In some situations, the cost of continuing
will simply be too great. In deciding whether to continue or switch, one must weigh the costs and benefits of the two options (Staw & Ross, 1987). When
the initial investment is large and the original decision was made carelessly, the long-term benefit of
learning a lesson will often outweigh the cost of investing additional resources. Whether it does in a
particular situation will depend on factors such as
the amount of additional resources required and the
likelihood of making a similar decision in the future
(i.e., the probability that one will be able to use the
lesson learned).
The learn-a-lesson response received higher overall ratings than both the punishment and consistency
arguments. It was viewed favorably both for a parent
deciding with a child and for an adult acting alone.
In addition, the effect of decision maker was largest for this response, and it was the only response
influenced by decision-making level of care, which
otherwise had no effect on ratings of the various responses. These results point to the importance of
learning a lesson in explaining sunk cost behavior.
Consequently, in Experiments 2 and 3, we explored
the learn-a-lesson response further by focusing on
additional variables that might have an impact on its
attractiveness as an argument for continuing a failed
plan.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the age of the child was not
specified beyond characterizing the child as “young”
to indicate a minor. If it is beneficial to teach a child
a lesson, it seems reasonable to assume that this
benefit will increase as the child’s age decreases.
Younger children’s behavior patterns are less fully
determined, so they are generally viewed as more
malleable; they have had less opportunity to be
taught the lesson already; and simply because they
are younger, any learning will have a potentially
greater payoff spread out over their expected lifespan. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the age of the
child involved in a sunk cost situation to test the hypothesis that the learn-a-lesson response is more desirable for relatively young children. It can be argued that the learn-a-lesson response is actually less
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desirable for very young children because they may
be too young to learn to think more carefully before
making future decisions. However, Elias, BrandenMuller, and Sayette (1991) have found that even elementary schoolchildren can learn how to improve
their decision making. Consequently, the scenarios
in Experiment 2 described children who were elementary school age or older.
Because of the conflicting literature on the effect
of personal responsibility on the sunk cost effect
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Staw, 1976; Whyte, 1993),
we also varied whether the participant took the perspective of the decision maker or merely made a
recommendation for a decision maker portrayed as a
hypothetical other.
Method
Participants. The participants were 79 students
at Louisiana State University who received extra
course credit.
Materials and design. The parent–child versions
of the four scenarios for which the learn-a-lesson effect was strongest in Experiment 1 were used. There
were four different versions of each scenario, which
resulted from crossing the two variables of amount
of initial investment (same as Experiment 1) and
age of the learner (7 or 8 years old vs. 15 or 16).
Two younger ages and two older ages were used to
make the within-subject manipulation of the learner’s age less transparent. The same counterbalancing procedures were used as in Experiment 1, yielding four separate stimulus sets that each contained
all four experimental conditions.
The perspective of the decision maker was added
as a wholly between-subjects variable. Half of the
participants were instructed to imagine themselves
as the decision maker. These participants read scenarios referring to “you”; for example, “Your daughter Becky wants to take cello lessons.” They answered the question, “What would you do?” in that
situation. The remaining participants read scenarios
describing another person; for example, “Agatha’s
daughter Becky wants to take cello lessons.” They
were asked, “What should Agatha do?”
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1 with the sole exception that participants read and rated four instead of eight sunk cost
scenarios.
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Results and Discussion
Average ratings of the five responses. The overall rankings of the responses were the same as in
Experiment 1 (see Table 3). The normative response received the highest mean rating (5.66) and
was also assigned the highest rating more often than
any other response (45%). The waste response was
given a lower average rating (4.60) and was rated
highest on 15% of the trials. The learn-a-lesson response was given a similar average rating (4.58)
and was assigned the highest rating on 22% of the
trials, suggesting that this argument was the primary
motivation behind sunk cost behavior. The comparatively high ratings assigned to the lesson response
in this experiment were likely due to the fact that it
had only parent–child scenarios. The consistency
and punishment responses received average ratings
of 3.87 and 1.82, respectively.
Effects of perspective, age of learner, and amount
of invested resources. Each of the five responses
was used as the dependent variable in an ANOVA
containing the between-subjects variable of perspective of the decision maker (decision made by self
or other) and the within-subjects variables of age of
child and level of invested resources, as well as the
two-way interactions among all three variables. Table 5 shows the mean response for each level of perspective, age, and amount of resources.
As in Experiment 1, the normative response was
rated as more appropriate when a small amount of
resources had been sunk into the project than when
a large amount had been invested, F(1, 229) = 6.26,
p < .02; whereas the waste response was rated as
more appropriate when a large amount of resources
had been invested compared with a relatively small
amount, F(1, 229) = 6.04, p < .02. The normative
and waste responses did not show any effect of perspective or age of child (F s < 1). However, the
waste response showed an interaction between perspective and age of child, F(1, 229) = 3.95, p < .05,
indicating higher ratings for an older child in the
“other” condition (5.09 vs. 4.49), but higher ratings
for a younger child in the “self” condition (4.62 vs.
4.22).
As in Experiment 1, ratings for the learn-a-lesson
response were higher for a high level of invested resources, F(1, 229) = 9.59, p < .01. There was no significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 74) = 1.10,
p > .29, or of age of child (F < 1). Thus, participants
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Table 5. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 2
Response
Normative
Variable
M
SD
Invested resources
High
5.27 3.16
Low
6.03** 3.32
Age of child
Younger
5.61 3.34
Older
5.70 3.18
Perspective
Other
5.46 3.06
Self
5.84 3.45

Waste
M

SD

Lesson
M

SD

Consistency

Punishment

M

SD

M

SD

4.93** 3.22
4.27
2.89

5.01** 3.04
4.14
2.88

3.88
3.87

2.83
2.82

1.82
1.82

1.78
1.72

4.56
4.65

3.06
3.10

4.50
4.65

2.94
3.04

3.84
3.91

2.87
2.78

1.79
1.82

1.74
1.77

4.79
4.42

2.97
3.17

4.78
4.38

3.00
2.98

3.89
3.86

2.74
2.90

1.89
1.75

1.75
1.76

**p < .05.

did not view learning a lesson as more appropriate
for younger children. Finally, consistency and punishment ratings did not show any effects of perspective, age of child, or level of invested resources, F
s(1, 229) < 2.3, p s > .13.
The sole effect of the self–other distinction was
an interaction between perspective and age of child
on ratings of the waste response. Although this interaction seemed to suggest that perspective is important when it comes to dealing with children
(i.e., one’s own are treated differently from someone else’s), we caution against drawing any conclusions because of our failure to replicate it in ratings
of any of the other responses. As Arkes and Blumer
(1985) noted, it is difficult to construct a valid manipulation of personal involvement with questionnaire studies, as opposed to observations of genuinely consequential behavior. When responsibility
is manipulated by varying whether the present decision maker or someone else made the usually hypothetical initial investment, the decision maker’s decision to continue or switch is affected (e.g., Staw,
1976; Staw & Ross, 1977; Whyte, 1993); but when
responsibility is manipulated by varying the participant’s perspective (i.e., whether the present decision maker is the participant or a third party), it has
less or no effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Because
learning a lesson would not be feasible in the former
case—where the original decision maker may not be
involved in the current decision—the present experiment manipulated the decision maker’s perspective.
Our failure to demonstrate an effect of perspective
reflects the subtle nature of personal responsibility
effects in this domain.

Although there is reason to predict that learning a
lesson would be especially beneficial for a younger
child, in Experiment 2 we found no effect of the
child’s age. This failure may indicate that there are
other reasons beside a child’s age as to why parent–
child scenarios are particularly likely to evoke learna-lesson arguments. This possibility is explored in
Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
An alternative explanation for why it is more
important to teach a lesson to a child rather than
oneself is that parents have a fiduciary responsibility to children that involves teaching lessons. In
contrast, adults are not usually viewed as having a
social responsibility to teach lessons to themselves.
This explanation implies that teaching a lesson
would be rated highly in other teacher–learner situations, even if the learner were not a young person.
Although teaching a lesson might occur in adult–
adult relationships as well, the learn-a-lesson rationale should be particularly attractive in a parent–child relationship, owing to parents’ special
responsibilities.
Experiment 3 was designed to test this hypothesis. Four scenarios from Experiment 1 were used.
An additional four scenarios that involved adult
learners were created. Therefore, one experimental factor was the type of scenario: half the scenarios described a situation that contained either a child
learner or an adult alone, and half described situations involving either an adult learner or an adult
alone. Thus, within each scenario, a second factor
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was whether a teacher had an opportunity to teach
a lesson to a learner or whether a single adult acted
alone. A third within-scenario factor was the level
of cost already sunk into the project. Participants responded to all eight scenarios and saw all combinations of the three factors.
Method
Participants. Participants were 86 undergraduate
students at Louisiana State University who received
extra course credit.
Materials and design. Eight scenarios were used.
Four had been used in Experiment 1; the remaining
four scenarios were new ones that described either
a single adult or 2 adults making a decision together
(see Appendix). For example, see Scenario 12 with
alternate versions in parentheses below:
Leroy is a private in the Army. His commanding officer, Jim, orders Leroy to figure out (and report to him)
the best way to catalog all of the weapons in a large storehouse. . . . He must work alone, and without supervision
(or must have his commanding officer’s approval). . . . After working on the job for 2 weeks (or 2 months), Leroy
figures out a new method that will allow him to do the
whole job, from start to finish, in only 4 weeks. It will take
another 2 months to finish doing the inventory the original
way. (Leroy needs his commanding officer Jim’s approval
to change methods.) What should Leroy (or Jim) do?

It was not possible to construct plausible adult–
child and adult–adult versions of the same scenario.
Consequently, rather than comparing an adult–adult
scenario directly with an adult–child scenario, each
was compared with its own adult-alone control condition. The perspective in all scenarios was such
that participants were asked, “What should [the decision maker] do?” as in Experiment 1. There were
four versions of each scenario, which resulted from
crossing the factors of the identity of the decision
maker (teacher and learner versus adult alone) and
the amount of the original investment (high versus
low).
The two scenario types—parent–child/adult alone
and adult–adult/adult alone—were presented in alternating order. The presentation order of the remaining conditions was counterbalanced by a partial
Latin-square design, which yielded four different
questionnaire sets. Although the order of the scenarios within each set was fixed, half of the participants
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completed each set in forward order, and half completed the set in backward order (see Footnote 3 on
p. 257). Thus, each of the eight conditions appeared
in each ordinal position an equal proportion of the
time. Each participant responded to all eight scenarios and all combinations of the three variables.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that
used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Average ratings of the five responses. The overall
ranking of the responses was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 3). The normative response
received the highest mean rating (7.07) and was also
assigned the highest rating on the majority of trials
(62%). The waste response was given a lower average rating (4.70), and the learn-a-lesson response a
still lower rating (4.02). The consistency (3.36) and
punishment (2.50) responses received the lowest average ratings.
Effects of decision maker, type of scenario, and
amount of invested resources. Each of the five responses was used as the dependent variable in an
ANOVA containing the within-subjects variables of
type of scenario (adult–adult/adult alone or parent–
child/adult alone), decision maker (teacher–learner
or adult alone), and level of invested resources, and
two-way interactions among these variables. If the
parent–child relationship is especially conducive to
teaching a lesson, compared with adult–adult relationships, then learn-a-lesson ratings would show
a significant interaction between scenario type and
decision maker, indicating a greater effect of having a teacher and a learner (opposed to an adult
alone) when the teacher and learner are parent and
child. Conversely, ratings of the normative response
should yield an interaction in the opposite direction.
Mean responses are shown in Table 6.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the waste response
was rated as more appropriate, F(1, 590) = 5.91, p
< .02, when a large (compared with a small) amount
of resources had been sunk into the project; and the
normative response was rated as more appropriate for a low compared with a high level of invested
resources, although the latter effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 590) = 2.92, p < .09. As in
Experiment 1, the normative response was rated as
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Table 6. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 3
Response
Normative
Variable
Invested resources
High
Low
Decision maker
Teacher and learner
Adult alone
Type of scenario
Parent-child/control
2 adults/control

M

SD

6.92
7.23

3.13
2.99

Waste
M

Lesson
SD

M

SD

Consistent
M

SD

Punishment
M

SD

4.91** 3.00
4.49 2.93

4.31** 2.97
3.74
2.81

3.49
3.23

2.51
2.47

2.67** 2.31
2.32
1.97

6.62 3.19
7.53** 2.87

4.87
4.54

3.04
2.89

4.51** 3.05
3.54
2.66

3.51** 2.57
3.20 2.40

2.80** 2.38
2.19
1.85

6.85 3.15
7.30** 2.96

4.82
4.58

2.98
2.96

4.16
3.89

3.44
3.27

2.55
2.45

2.89
2.91

2.55
2.43

2.18
2.13

**p < .05.

more appropriate when an adult acted alone than
when a teacher and learner decided together, F(1,
590) = 24.71, p < .0001. It was rated similarly for
adult–adult/adult-alone scenarios and for parent–
child/adult-alone scenarios, F(1, 6) < 1. 4 As predicted, there was a significant interaction between
type of scenario and decision maker, F(1, 590) =
3.78, p = .05 (see Figure 2), indicating that although
the normative response was always more appropriate for single decision makers, this effect was especially pronounced when the teacher–learner version
of the scenario involved a child. Thus, the normative response was least attractive when there was a
child learner.
In corroborating the first two experiments, we
found that the learn-a-lesson response was viewed
as more appropriate for large amounts of invested
resources, F(1, 590) = 11.85, p < .001. It was also
rated higher when a teacher had an opportunity to
teach a lesson to a learner than when the decision
maker was acting alone, F(1, 590) = 34.65, p <
.0001, replicating Experiment 1. As in Experiment
1, this overall pattern of results was not due simply
to the teacher–learner condition. Within the adultalone condition, the learn-a-lesson response was
perceived as more appropriate than both the punishment, t (344) = 10.43, p < .001, and consistency responses, t (344) = 2.36, p < .02.
The type of scenario had no main effect on learna-lesson ratings, F(2, 6) < 1, whereas the interaction
between type of scenario and decision maker was
marginally significant, F(1, 590) = 3.44, p < .07.
As predicted, the difference between the teacher–

learner and adult-alone conditions was larger for the
scenarios in which the learner was a child (M = 4.79
vs. 3.52, respectively) than for scenarios in which
the learner was an adult (M = 4.22 vs. 3.56, respectively; see Figure 2). Thus, teaching a lesson is seen
as more appropriate for a child learner than for an
adult learner. This interaction is consistent with the
normative response ratings: the learn-a-lesson argument is most attractive and the normative response
least attractive when there is a learner present and
that learner is a child.
As predicted, even in the case of adult learners, teaching a lesson is a more appropriate rationale when two people are involved. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the learn-a-lesson response
was rated higher in both the parent–child and adult
teacher–adult learner conditions than in their respective adult-alone control conditions, F s(1, 591) >
8.0, p s < .01. In other words, the participants believed that one can teach an old dog a new trick.
The pattern of results for the punishment and consistency responses was very similar to that obtained
in Experiment 1. The punishment response received
higher ratings for the high relative to the low level
of invested resources, F(1, 590) = 7.47, p < .01; for
the consistency response, this effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 590) = 3.10, p < .08. Like
the lesson response, the consistency and punishment
responses were both rated higher when a teacher
4 For the main effect of scenario type, we used the quasi F
ratio recommended by Winer (1971) and Clark (1973), which
incorporates the variance due to scenarios within each type.
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had an opportunity to teach a lesson to a learner than
when an adult acted alone, F s(1, 590) > 4.4, p s <
.05, but the interactions with scenario type were not
significant.
General Discussion
In all three experiments, the normative response
was rated lower when a high level of resources had
already been invested into the current project compared with a small initial investment; the opposite
was true for the waste response. This result replicates the basic sunk cost effect demonstrated by
Arkes and Blumer (1985) and others (e.g., Garland, 1990; Thaler, 1980). Although “throwing good
money after bad” is usually perceived as an indication of biased or irrational thinking (Baron, 1990),
we were able to uncover potentially rational reasons
for engaging in sunk cost behavior. In addition to
the traditional desire not to waste already expended
resources, we explored three factors that might explain perseverance with a plan that is no longer optimal: the opportunity to learn a lesson, the provision
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of punishment as a possible deterrent, and the desire
to appear consistent.
Across the three experiments, participants’ ratings
showed a consistent preference for the normative response (i.e., switch to the alternative), followed in
descending order by the following arguments for
continuing the original plan: waste, learn-a-lesson, consistency, and punishment. Overall, choosing a non-normative response was quite common;
across experiments, participants chose to continue
the original plan an average of 43% of the time, a
figure that is comparable with that found in previous
studies (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Larrick et al.,
1990). More important than the overall frequency of
sunk cost behavior, participants’ willingness to endorse each possible argument varied as a function
of a number of variables. In all three experiments,
variables that increased the attractiveness of the various reasons for continuing the original plan made
the normative response appear correspondingly less
appropriate.
The waste response was affected only by the level
of invested resources. Participants’ greater disincli-

Figure 2. Mean ratings of the learn-a-lesson and normative responses with standard errors for Experiment 3 shown as a function of scenario type (parent–child/adult alone or adult–adult/adult alone)
and number of decision makers (adult alone or teacher–learner).
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nation to waste additional resources as the amount
already invested increased is consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler,
1980). However, prospect theory does not predict
an effect of variables such as whether the decision
maker acted alone, the care with which the decision
was made, or the nature of the relationship between
teacher and learner. The other three responses were
influenced by these variables.
The opportunity to learn a lesson was the strongest of the remaining alternatives. The learn-a-lesson
response received higher ratings in situations where
learning a lesson would be especially beneficial or
appropriate. In Experiments 1 and 3, higher learna-lesson ratings occurred when a teacher had an opportunity to teach a lesson to a learner than when
someone acted alone. To teach oneself a lesson, one
must already know it, making the teaching paradoxical. Nevertheless, this “multiple self” approach (Elster, 1986; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) is supported by
the fairly high ratings received by the learn-a-lesson
response compared with two other possible rationales (i.e., punishment and consistency), even when
an adult acted alone.
In Experiment 2, the attractiveness of the learna-lesson response for teacher–learner scenarios
was not influenced by the age of the learner or by
whether the subject adopted the perspective of the
teacher or of a third party. In Experiment 3, the
teacher–learner effect extended to adult learners
as well. The implication of these results is that the
lesson response is viewed as more appropriate in
teacher–learner situations not merely because of the
learner’s youth, but because of the social role that
makes teaching a lesson appropriate. Nonetheless,
the learn-a-lesson response was rated as more appropriate when the teacher and learner were parent
and child rather than two adults, suggesting that the
parent–child relationship is especially conducive to
teaching a lesson. Parents’ teaching role might be
expected to lead them to instruct their children to
ignore sunk costs and thereby make more cost-effective decisions (Baron, 1990). However, the results of the present experiments suggest that this
tendency can be overridden by the long-term benefits that are derived from forcing a continuation of
the original plan—namely, teaching the child a useful lesson that will improve the child’s future decision making.
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A final influence on ratings of the lesson response was revealed in Experiment 1, which demonstrated that learn-a-lesson ratings were higher
when the original decision had involved a large
cost and had been made carelessly. In this situation, learning to think more carefully would have
a particularly high benefit by improving future decisions and saving large amounts of resources. In
such cases, continuing a previous course of action may be rational in the long-term, though more
costly in the short-term, because of its effect on future decision making.
The ratings of the consistency and punishment
arguments indicate that the effect of having a separate learner is not specific to the learn-a-lesson argument, but also generalizes to other arguments for
why decision makers should experience the consequences of their failed decisions. As predicted, the
importance of appearing a consistent decision maker
increased as the stakes involved increased. The other
variable that affected ratings of the consistency response was whether the decision maker acted alone
or in concert with another. This result suggests that
parents (or other teachers) are more concerned with
the learner’s appearing consistent than they are with
viewing themselves as consistent.
In Experiments 1 and 3, ratings of the punishment
argument were also influenced by the amount of the
initial investment and whether the decision maker
acted alone. As predicted, this response seemed
more attractive when the investment was relatively
high and the decision maker was acting on behalf of
another person. It is interesting to note that the punishment and learn-a-lesson arguments were affected
in the same way by these two variables. Teaching
a lesson and punishment can effectively serve the
same purpose: improving the quality of one’s future
decisions. Despite this conceptual relationship, ratings of the learn-a-lesson and punishment responses
were no more highly correlated than any other pair
of responses. Punishment may also involve mere
retribution without a clear explication of its deterrent effects on future decision making. The generally higher ratings for learning a lesson than for punishment suggest that the former is a more obvious
means of improving future behavior. Additional research is called for that explores how the framing of
punishment (i.e., as either a beneficial lesson or as
just desserts) would affect the attractiveness of this
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argument. A related topic for future research is what
reasons subjects themselves would give for sunk
cost behavior, if reasons were not provided by the
experimenter.
The importance of learning a lesson does not apply to all sunk cost situations. For example, there is
no clear benefit to teaching oneself a lesson in cases
where someone else made the initial investment or
where one is forced to choose between two identical
purchases that differ only in the amount that each
one cost (cf. Arkes & Blumer, 1985, Experiment 6).
However, sunk cost situations frequently present an
opportunity for the decision maker to learn a lesson.
As Brockner and Rubin (1985) pointed out, “Entrapment—under certain special circumstances at
least—can be construed as a phenomenon that can
serve constructive ends” (p. 255). In judging the rationality of sunk cost behavior, one needs to weigh
the costs and benefits of the options to switch or
to continue, where those costs and benefits are not
limited to measurable resources such as money and
time. In many situations, the costs of continuing will
outweigh the potential benefits—for example, if little was invested initially, continuing would exhaust
all of one’s remaining resources, the initial decision
was carefully thought out, and the decision maker is
unlikely to encounter a similar situation in the future. On the other hand, if the long-term benefits of
learning and implementing the lesson outweigh the
immediate costs of sticking to the original plan, then
sunk cost behavior does not represent fallacious
reasoning.
In commenting on “the rhetoric of irrationality,”
Lopes (1991) noted an overemphasis in the judgment and decision-making literature on the negative aspects of people’s performance and a comparative neglect of situations in which they reason
well (see also Christensen-Szalanski & Beach,
1984). What appears to be a bias in the laboratory may be functional behavior in a more realistic context (Funder, 1987; Hogarth, 1981), where
a variety of justifications for the behavior can be
considered. In general, ignoring sunk costs is an
adaptive, cost-effective strategy. Yet what appears
to be biased, irrational behavior—such as decreasing utility through attention to irretrievably wasted
resources—can be described as “meta-rational”
(Jungermann, 1986), assuming the benefits of
learning and implementing the lesson outweigh the
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costs of sticking to the original plan. However, it
raises the interesting question of why continuing a
failed plan is the best (or even a good) way to learn
to make better decisions in the future. Perhaps one
could both abandon the current unsuccessful plan
and learn to think more carefully in future decisions. However, we argue that continuing with the
unsuccessful plan is a particularly effective means
of learning the lesson because the consequences of
one’s original decision are then “in-kind,” thereby
providing better feedback than merely noting that
the original decision was made badly. In support of
this conclusion, other research has shown that decision makers prefer punishments that fit the crime
(Beattie & Baron, 1995).
Sunk cost behavior occurs in a variety of domains. Although the present studies, like most
demonstrations of the phenomenon, have a laboratory setting, numerous examples can be drawn
from real-world behavior. People’s tendency to allow past decisions to influence current ones in a
suboptimal fashion has been observed in interpersonal relationships (Brockner & Rubin, 1985);
in political decision making (Janis, 1982; Teger,
1980); and in real organizational settings, where it
can lead to escalation of commitment in financial
decisions (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw, 1981), performance appraisals (Schoorman, 1988), and group
policy decisions (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Janis,
1982). Thus, it is clearly important to understand
why such behavior occurs, so that decision making in these and other situations might ultimately
be improved.
Staw and Ross (1987) identified a number of procedures for reducing escalation behavior, such as bifurcating initial and subsequent decision making
and lessening the consequences of failed decisions.
Another technique that they suggested is to provide
decision makers with negative feedback. An effective means of doing so would be for the decision
maker to experience the negative consequences of
the failed decision—in other words, to learn through
failure. The importance of negative feedback in
skill acquisition has been amply demonstrated in
the learning literature (e.g., Bilodeau, 1969), and it
has recently been applied to acquiring knowledge in
complex domains such as medicine (Clancey, 1987).
Thus, experiencing the consequences of a failed decision can be a very effective instructional device
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for learning how to make better decisions in the future. 5 This approach is likely to be especially attractive in the early stages of learning, as in training
a new employee; a more senior employee ought to
have learned the lesson already. Those interested in
improving decisions should emphasize all the consequences of continuing a plan, including learning a
lesson. Our results suggest that in teaching decision
makers to use better strategies, experiencing the consequences of one’s actions can be used as one means
of self-improvement.
In summary, decision makers may continue with
unwise plans for reasons not previously considered.
Because an initial investment of time or money in
many situations is made under conditions of uncertainty, it is possible to improve decision making in
such situations. A decision to continue with a failed
plan is sometimes justified by the desire to teach the
decision maker to be more careful in making future decisions. This response is attractive whether
the potential learner is a young child, an older child,
an adult, or even oneself. Finally, learning a lesson
is perceived as especially important when the original decision has been made carelessly and relatively
large resources have been invested, or when an adult
teacher has the opportunity to teach a lesson to a
child.
5

One need not experience failure personally in order to
learn the lesson; rather, one can also learn to make better decisions in sunk cost situations by observing a model continue a failed plan and then display regret at having done so
(Brockner et al., 1984). However, an appropriate model is
unlikely to be available much of the time.
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APPENDIX
Scenarios in Experiments 1–3
Experiment 1 used Scenarios 1–8. Experiment 2 used Scenarios 1, 3, 6, and 7. Experiment 3 used Scenarios
5–12. The amount of the initial investment (high vs. low) is in parentheses. Alternate versions of each scenario, including adult-alone versions, were constructed based on the design of each experiment.
1. Agatha’s young daughter Becky decides to take
cello lessons. After Agatha buys a cello and pays for
lessons ($1,200 for 3 months vs. $140 for 1 month),
Becky finds she is no longer interested and wants to
quit.

8. Young Sonya joins the soccer team. After her
mother Robin buys soccer equipment and Sonya attends several practices ($90 and 2 months vs. $25
and 1 week), Sonya decides she would rather play
softball.

2. Dan’s young daughter Edith selects a video to
rent. After Dan pays for it and they watch the beginning ($4 for 45 min vs. $.99 for 10 min), Edith realizes she is not enjoying the movie and wants to turn
it off.

9. Colleen agrees to pay for bridge lessons ($250
vs. $50) for her elderly mother Sylvia. After several
weeks of lessons, Sylvia loses interest and wants to
quit.

3. Ira’s young daughter Jill selects a school project. After Ira buys supplies and helps Jill work on it
(1 month vs. 1 week), Jill discovers a better project
that will take less time to complete.
4. At his urging, Harriet buys football tickets ($35
vs. $8) for her son George. Later, George’s favorite
player is hurt, so he doesn’t want to go to the game.
5. After a large meal, Paul asks his parents to buy
him a chocolate souffle ($7.95 vs. $1.50). After a
few bites he finds he is too full to finish it.
6. At his son’s request, Max buys ballet tickets
($80 vs. $15) for his son Luis. A week later, Luis is
invited to a party at the same time as the ballet. Luis
would prefer to go to the party.
7. Young Nathan urges his father Oscar to drive (4
hr vs. 30 min) to a state park for a hike. When they
arrive it has turned cold and rainy. Nathan would not
enjoy the planned hike and wants to go home.

10. An adult returning to school, Tanya selects a
paper topic and gets her professor’s approval. After
working on the paper (3 weeks vs. 4 days), Tanya
thinks of an alternative topic that is more interesting
and would take less time to complete.
11. Yvonne asks Dr. Xavier to prescribe a new
drug for her headaches. Yvonne buys a supply ($450
for 6 months vs. $90 for 6 weeks), but 1 week before
finishing the medication decides that it isn’t helping
and wants to stop.
12. A private in the Army, Leroy plans a way to
inventory weapons for his commanding officer, Jim.
After working on it (2 months vs. 2 weeks), Leroy
figures out a new method that will take less time to
complete.

